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In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We develop
a Ramsey model of economic growth with a rival but non-excludable public good which is ﬁnanced by taxes
which can be evaded via corrupt tax inspectors. We prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax
collection, in a dynamic framework, is not unique, but is different depending on the relevance of the “shame
effect”. We show that in all three cases — “low, middle and high shame” countries, the growth rate increases
as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value, after which the growth rate begins to decrease as the tax
rate increases. But, for intermediate tax rates, the rate of growth for “low shame” countries is lower than that
of “uniform shame” countries which is, in turn, lower than that of “high shame” countries. This happens
because the growth rate is more sensitive to variations of t in an honest country rather than in a corrupt
country.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Tax evasion and ﬁscal corruption have been a general and
persistent problem throughout history with serious economic con-
sequences, not only in transition economies, but also in countries with
developed tax systems. In general, tax evasion and corruption can
have ambiguous effects on economic growth: tax evasion increases
the amount of resources accumulated by entrepreneurs, but it also
reduces the amount of public services supplied by the government,
thus leading to negative consequences for economic growth. Although
there is extensive literature investigating the origins, effects and
extent of tax evasion and corruption, from both theoretical and
empirical points of view, interaction between them has been partially
explored. The analysis of tax evasion in the tax compliance literature
dates back at least to the classic paper of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972). Since then, a large amount of literature relating to corruption
and tax evasion has emerged but, only recently canwe ﬁnd theoretical
models which study tax setting and evasion in a context of growth
models (e.g. Lin and Yang (2001), Chen (2003) and Ellis and Fender
(2006)).
Lin and Yang (2001) extended the portfolio choice model of tax
evasion from a static to a dynamic setting, ﬁnding that, while growth is
decreasing with respect to tax rate in absence of evasion, it is U-shaped
with respect to the tax rate in thepresence of the tax evasion. In contrast
to our model, in their work, the public goods are not productive, then
diverting resources from the non-productive public sector to the
productive private sector, ﬁscal evasion will be conducive to economic
growth.
Chen (2003) integrates tax evasion into an AK model with public
capital ﬁnanced by income tax which can be evaded. In his model,
individuals optimize tax evasion, while the government optimizes the
tax rate, auditing and ﬁne rate, given the evasion level decided by
consumers. In general, these policies have ambiguous effects, but for
some parameters the author ﬁnds that the growth rate decreases as
tax evasion increases.
Ellis and Fender (2006) introduce endogenous corruption into a
variant of the Ramsey growth model where a government taxes
private producers and uses the resources to either supply public
capital or simply consumes the taxes itself (corruption form).
We deal not with bureaucratic but with ﬁscal corruption which
establishes a direct impact of evasion/corruption on tax revenues, and
thus on economic growth.
In ourwork,we develop a Ramseymodel of economic growthwith a
rival but non-excludable public good which is ﬁnanced by a percentage
of taxes. We also assume that tax auditing may be performed by a
corruptible tax inspector, who takes a bribe in exchange for not
reporting the detected evasion, in accordance with Chander and Wilde
(1992), Hindricks et al. (1999) and Sanyal et al. (2000). Thus, in our
model, evasion goes hand in hand with the corruption of the tax
inspector. In particular, we analyze the implications of endogenous
evasion and corruption at a micro level and then we use the results of
our static game as a framework for the growth model. In fact, taxation
and tax evasion, in turn, inﬂuence both the provision of the public good
and capital accumulation, affecting output and economic growth in two
opposite ways: on one hand, higher tax evasion implies more capital
accumulation and thus more economic growth; on the other hand,
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higher tax evasion leads to lower tax revenues, less provision of the
public good and thus, a lower economic growth rate.
In contrast with some lines of research on tax evasion, we do not
consider the issue of optimal remuneration of tax inspectors by
assuming that the inspector is paid a ﬁxed wage.1
We prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax
collection is not unique but is different depending on the relevance of
the “shame effect” and depending on the static or dynamic context of
the analysis.
Our work is part of one of two lines of research taken by literature
on tax evasion (Feld and Frey, 2007), i.e. the line of research which
considers tax morale as the key factor to explaining the fact that,
contrary to the results of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), “people who
exhibit empirically observed levels of risk aversion normally pay their
taxes, although there is a low probability of getting caught and being
penalized” (Frey and Torgler, 2007). In particular, we consider a
growthmodel where the aggregate tax evasion is determined by non-
pecuniary costs which depend upon the entrepreneurs' attitude to
social stigma.2 In this respect, we analyze a dynamicmodel, where the
aggregate tax evasion is microfounded on non-pecuniary costs.
Several empirical studies highlight the importance of non-
economic factors on tax evasion: Alm and Torgler (2006) ﬁnd that
the tax morale can explain more than 20% of the total variance of the
variable size of the shadow economy (used as a measure of tax
evasion); thus, if taxmorale is declining, the shadow economy is likely
to increase. Richardson (2006) shows, in an empirical analysis based
on data for 45 countries, that non-economic determinants have the
strongest impact on tax evasion: in particular, tax morale is an
important determinant of tax evasion.
According to Kim (2003), we assume that people may fear social
stigma (shame effect) only if they are detected as cheaters/corrupted.
In this paper, we have extended the static analysis of Cerqueti and
Coppier (2009), in a long run context incorporating the presence of a
public sector. Indeed, in the short-run, it is a plausible assumption that
governments can be completely opportunistic, that is, they provide
nothing for the citizenry, not even national defense. But, in the long
run, even taxpayers who are initially ashamed of cheating will
eventually change their minds and become less ashamed. It is
doubtful that the citizenry will have a strong sense of loyalty to an
opportunistic government, especially one that offers no productive
output to its citizens. Following Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992), we
incorporate a public good into a growth model. Considering in a
growth model also the “productive” effect of tax revenues i.e. the
provision of public goods, we obtain different results from e.g. Chen
(2003) and Lin and Yang (2001) who consider only the negative effect
of taxes on capital accumulation. In order to be more precise, we show
that in all three cases — “low, middle and high shame” countries, the
growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value,
after which the growth rate begins to decrease as the tax rate
increases. As we will see, this result derives from the behavior of tax
revenues in a static framework.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a
discussion about some stylized facts concerning evasion, corruption
and growth. In Section 3, we ﬁrst present the model and then we
formalize and solve the game, describing the model in a static
framework. In Section 4 we extend the analysis into a dynamic
context, endogenizing output and we go on to analyze the
relationship between the tax rate, dynamic tax revenues and the
income growth rate. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Empirical motivation of the paper: some stylized facts
This section contains some stylized facts about corruption, evasion
and their relationship.
The phenomenon of tax evasion is of great relevance when the State
collects taxes. In the U.S., the Internal Revenue Service estimates that
17% of income tax liability is not paid (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). In
economieswhere there is a great extent of corruption, this is related to a
high level of tax evasion (see Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000). In this respect,
the analysis of tax evasion in a corrupted environment is an important
area of research, and empirical economics literature contains some
evidence. In particular, two types of corruption may take place:
bureaucratic corruption and ﬁscal corruption. The former concerns the
attitude of bureaucrats who ask for a bribe in order to guarantee public
services while the latter is related to the dishonesty of tax inspectors,
who ask for a bribe in order not to report evasion. Since in this work we
deal with the problem of ﬁscal corruption, we rely henceforth only on
the literature on the latter. Chu (1990) mentions that, in a survey
undertaken by the city government of Taipei in 1981, 94% of monitored
tax administrators are corrupt; in Sanyal et al. (2000), The Police Group
in 1985 suggests that 76% of all Indian tax auditors are corrupt and that
68% of taxpayers had paid bribes. Ul Haque and Sahay (1996) state that
20–30% of Nepalese tax revenue goes to bribery, and cite a former prime
minister of Thailand as evidencing that corruption is associated to the
loss of 50% of tax revenues.
It is worth noticing that evasion is a necessary condition for ﬁscal
corruption. Therefore, the analysis of the phenomenon of evasion may
provide several insights into the dynamics of ﬁscal corruption. The
empirical evidence gives that the occurrence of evasion is also driven by
the level of tax rate implemented by the State. This aspect is
theoretically conﬁrmed when the analysis is carried out in accordance
with the classical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Indeed,
when the ﬁne imposed on evaders is independent from the tax rate, an
increase in the tax rate makes honesty more expensive, while the costs
of evasion remain unchanged. In particular, higher tax rates encourage
rather than repress tax evasion. In a large majority of the cases,
experimental, econometric and survey evidence shows that an increase
in the tax rate leads to an increase in tax evasion.3 Some notable
exceptions, however, are Feinstein (1991) and Alm et al. (1993), who
ﬁnd a negative relationship between tax rates and tax evasion. A further
supporting argument on the positive relationship between tax evasion
and tax rates can be found in Gupta (2005, 2006). The author analyzes
data related to Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain— countries with awell-
established tradition of tax evasion— and showshowhigher tax evasion
would cause a benevolent social planner to optimally increase the tax
rates, when implicit taxation is also available as a source of revenue. Our
paper also, in a static context, conﬁrms this stylized fact, showing that as
the tax rate increases the number of entrepreneurs who will ﬁnd it
worthwhile to be corrupt, i.e. evaders, increases.
A further economic variable to be considered in order to describe
corruption is the monitoring level of the State. A remarkable amount
of empirical work has validated the deterrence effect of the
probability of being caught (auditing) and of penalty severity,
although some differences appear regarding the size of the deterrence
1 For example Besley and McLaren (1993), Hindriks et al. (1999) and Mookherejee
and Png (1995), deal with the issue of optimal remuneration of inspectors. Besley and
McLaren (1993) compare three distinct remuneration schemes which provide
different incentives to the inspectors: efﬁciency wages, reservation wages and
capitulation wages. Hindriks et al. (1999) consider a model where all the actors are
dishonest. Mookherejee and Png (1995) also consider only corruptible agents, but they
remove the exogenous matching of the auditor and the evader: they consider it a
moral hazard problem, since, for evasion to be disclosed, the inspector has to exert a
costly non-observable effort.
2 For a complete review of the main hypothesis proposed in literature on the
different types of non-pecuniary costs that inﬂuence tax morale see Dell'Anno (2009).
3 See, for example, Friedland et al. (1978); Clotfelter (1983); Baldry (1987);
Christian and Gupta (1993); Jaulfaian and Rider (1996); Andreoni et al. (1998) and
Pudney et al. (2000).
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effects on tax compliance.4 Moreover, experimental analyses have
shown the positive relationship between penalties, audit probability
and level of compliance.5
In Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001) data from Tanzania are analysed.
It is proved that compliance is more likely when the probability of
being caught is perceived to be high or when sanctions against
evasion are severe.
In a static context, our ﬁndings agree with the stylized facts
described above: indeed, as the probability of being caught increases,
the number of entrepreneurs whowill ﬁnd it worthwhile to be honest
increases as well, and corruption is less widespread.
Let us now deal with the dynamic context. In this case, the
empirical evidence about taxation and growth shows that in cross-
country studies a negative link between the tax burden (measured by
tax revenue to GDP) and growth for high-income countries emerges.
However, the result does not hold for low and middle-income
countries, perhaps reﬂecting measurement problems.6 Firm-level
empirical results, as well as simulation results using computable
general equilibrium models, support the contrasting view that higher
taxes negatively affect growth.7 Our model conﬁrms this stylized fact.
Indeed, from low tax rates, the calibration we perform shows a
decreasing relationship between growth and tax rates.
As we will see, the ﬁndings of our paper are in accordance with the
stylized facts reported above.
3. The model
We start from Cerqueti and Coppier (2009), and we consider an
economy which produces a single homogeneous good, with quantity
y∈ [0,+∞). There are three players in the economy: controllers, tax
inspectors and entrepreneurs. We consider that the private good is
produced by using two production factors, capital k and the public good
with quantity G∈ [0,+∞). The provision of the public good allows us to
have a rationale for the existence of a government which uses tax
revenues to ﬁnance the public good. Following Barro and Sala-I-Martin
(2003), we consider a rival but non-excludable public goodG in order to
take the problem of congestion of the public good into account. In
particular, G represents public infrastructure such as highways, the
water system, police and ﬁre services and courts which are subject to
congestion. In this case, the public good available to an individual
entrepreneur is the ratio of total public purchases G to the aggregate
private capital. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2003) consider Yi = AKi f
G
Y
 
,
but they stressed also that the same resultswouldbe obtainedunder the
speciﬁcation that G had to rise in relation to aggregate private capital K.
We deﬁne the number of entrepreneurs as n as the number of tax
inspectors, K as the aggregate capital of entrepreneurs, A as the
productivity parameter summarizing the level of technology and G as
the public good.
The j-th entrepreneur uses their available per capita quantity of
capital kj∈ [0,+∞) in the production sector. We state the same
hypothesis of Lin and Yang (2001), and assume that the capital per
person kj=k is ﬁxed and is equal for each entrepreneur, in a static
setting. For simplicity, we hypothesize that capital does not
depreciate. Then, the individual production function of the good
depends only on the capital, public good and the natural state which
may occur: we consider α∈(0,1) and δ∈(0,1) such that production
will be y = Ak G=Kð Þα with a probability (1−δ), while with a
probability δ an adverse natural state will occur, production will not
take place and the corresponding production will be y=0.
Following Barro (1990), we assume that the public good is ﬁnanced
contemporaneously by a percentage η, with η∈ [0,1], of tax revenues E.8
Tax inspectors cannot invest in the production activity and earn a salary
w∈[0,+∞) which is a portion of tax revenues: in order to be more
precise, w = 1−ηð Þ
n
⋅E. The tax inspector, who checks whether tax
payment is correct, is able to tell which of the two natural states have
occurred for each entrepreneur. It is common knowledge that the tax
inspector9 is corruptible, in the sense that s/he pursues her/his own
interest and not necessarily that of the State; in other words, the tax
inspector is open to bribery. The tax inspector, in the case of the “good”
natural state and in exchange for a bribe b∈ [0,+∞), can offer the
entrepreneur the opportunity of reporting that the “bad” natural state
has arisen. In this case, the entrepreneur could refuse to pay the bribe or
agree to pay the bribe and negotiate the amountwith the inspector. The
State monitors entrepreneurs' and tax inspectors' behavior through
controllers, in order toweed out or reduce corruption andﬁxes the level
of the tax rate t∈ [0,1] on the product y. Let q∈ [0,1] be the exogenous
monitoring level implemented by the State; then q is the probability of
being detected, given that corruption has taken place. Following
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), we assume that the entrepreneurs
incur a punishment rate c∈ [0,1] on unreported income.10 In addition
we consider that the entrepreneurs are not homogeneous agents, and to
bemore precise, the j-th entrepreneur attributes a subjective value cj to
theobjectivepunishment—dependingonher/his own “shameeffect”—
when the corrupt transaction is detected.11 The entrepreneur, if
detected, must pay taxes ty, her/his “shame cost”, but s/he is refunded
the cost of the bribe paid to the tax inspector.12
3.1. The game: description and solution
Given the new assumptions, the Cerqueti and Coppier (2009)
game becomes the following two-period game (see Fig. 1). In what
4 See e.g. Witte and Woodbury, 1985; Dubin and Wilde, 1988; Dubin et al., 1990;
Beron et al., 1992; Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Cebula, 1997, 2001; Cebula and Saltz,
2001.
5 See e.g. Friedland et al., 1978; Becker et al., 1987; Beck et al., 1991; Alm et al., 1992;
Slemrod et al., 2001.
6 See Blankenau, Nicole, and Tomljanovich (2004).
7 See Fishman and Svensson (2000) and Feltenstein and Shah (1995).
8 Conversely, Blackburn et al. (2006) assume that the public good is provided as a
ﬁxed proportion of output, while revenues consist of the tax collected by the
bureaucrat from high-income households, plus any ﬁnes imposed on the bureaucrat
detected in a corrupt transaction.
9 We assume that an entrepreneur is seen by only one inspector and cannot turn to
other inspectors to be treated differently.
10 In different models, Yitzhaki (1974) ﬁrst considers the penalty as a proportion of
the amount of evaded taxes, Caballé and Panadés (2007) show that when penalties are
imposed proportionally to the amount of evaded taxes, the rate of capital
accumulation cannot increase with the tax rate, while if the penalties are imposed
on the amount of unreported income, the amount of income concealed increases with
the tax rate.
11 In fact, if taxpayers' values are inﬂuenced by cultural factors, then the tax morale
may be an important determinant of taxpayer compliance and other forms of behavior
(see Alm and Torgler, 2006).
12 This assumption can be more easily understood when, rather than corruption,
there is extortion by the tax inspector, even though, in many countries, the relevant
provisions or laws stipulate that the bribe shall, in any case, be returned to the
entrepreneur, and that combined minor punishment, (penal and/or pecuniary), be
inﬂicted to her/him.
Fig. 1. The tree of the game.
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follows, we refer to the entrepreneur payoff by a superscript (1) and
to the inspector payoff by a superscript (2): they represent
respectively the ﬁrst and the second element of the payoff vector
P
π i; j = π
1ð Þ
i; j ;π
2ð Þ
i; j
 
; i = 1;2.
(1) At stage one, the tax inspector checks the entrepreneurs'
production. If a “bad” natural state occurs, then the tax
inspector reports that no tax is owed and in this case, the
game ends. Otherwise, if there is a “good” natural state, the tax
inspector may ask for the bribe bd and report that the “bad”
natural state has arisen and that the entrepreneur need not pay
any tax.
(1.1) If bd=0 no bribe is asked for, the game ends without
corruption and with the following payoff vector:
P
π
1; j
= Ak
G
K
 α
1−tð Þ; 1−ηð ÞE
n
 
: ð1Þ
(1.2) Otherwise, let bdN0 be the positive bribe asked for by the tax
inspector and the game continues to stage two.
(2) At stage two, the entrepreneur decides whether to negotiate
the bribe or not.
(2.1) If the entrepreneur refuses the bribe, then the payoff vector
is given by π1;j deﬁned as in (1). Then in this case, the game
ends. There is no penalty for the tax inspector.
(2.2) If the entrepreneur decides to agree to pay the bribe, the
negotiation starts and the two parties will negotiate the
bribe. In this case, the payoffs will depend on whether the
inspector and the entrepreneur are detected (with proba-
bility q) or not detected (with probability (1−q)). There is
no penalty for the tax inspector who is detected.13 In this
case, the game ends with corruption and evasion and the
expected payoff vector is given by:
P
π
2; j
= Ak
G
K
 α
1−qt−cjq
 
− 1−qð Þb; 1−ηð ÞE
n
+ 1−qð Þb
 
ð2Þ
We ﬁrst determine the equilibrium bribe bNB.14
Proposition 3.1. Let q≠1. Then there exists a unique non negative
bribe (bNB), as the Nash solution to a bargaining game, given by:
bNB = μ Ak
G
K
 α
t−
qcj
1−q
  
: ð3Þ
where μ ≡ ε
ε + β
is the share of the surplus that goes to the tax inspector
and β and ε are the parameters which can be interpreted as the
bargaining strength measures of the entrepreneur and the tax inspector
respectively.
We assume that the tax inspector and the entrepreneur share the
surplus on an equal basis, arriving at the standard Nash case, when
ε=β=1. In this case the bribe is:
bNB =
1
2
Ak
G
K
 α
t−
qcj
1−q
  
: ð4Þ
In other words, the bribe represents 50% of the saving which
comes from not paying taxes, net of the entrepreneur's “shame cost”,
if s/he is found out.In this case, the payoff vector is given by:
P
π
2; j
= Ak
G
K
 α
1−
qt + t + cjq
2
 
;
1−ηð ÞE
n
+ Ak
G
K
 α
⋅
t−qt−cjq
2
 
:
ð5Þ
By solving the static game, we can prove the following
proposition15:
Proposition 3.2. Let 0 ≤ t 1−qð Þ
q
= c⁎≤1. Then,
(a) if cj∈ [0,c⁎) the j-th entrepreneur will ﬁnd it worthwhile to be
corrupt and then the game ends with the payoff vector
P
π
2; j
;
(b) if cj∈ [c⁎,1] the j-th entrepreneur will ﬁnd it worthwhile to be
honest and then the game ends with the payoff vector
P
π
1; j
.
The threshold c⁎ can be interpreted as an honesty threshold.
This assumption about c⁎ in Proposition 4.1 holds true when we
assume the existence of a minimal threshold of monitoring activity
q∘ : =
t
1 + t
: ð6Þ
Thus, the honesty threshold c⁎ is well deﬁned when q≥q∘, e.g. the
monitoring level is great enough. We will suppose q≥q∘ in the
remaining part of the paper. Depending on the value of the “shame
cost” cj, two sub-game perfect Nash equilibria can be found:
• If cjbc⁎, the entrepreneur ﬁnds it worthwhile to start a negotiation
with the tax inspector. Thus the surplus to be shared between the
entrepreneur and the inspector will keep a negotiation going, the
outcome of which is the bribe corresponding to the Nash solution to
a bargaining game;
• If cj≥c⁎, what the entrepreneur obtains by evading taxes is not
enough to make up for his own expected “shame cost”. With this in
mind, the tax inspector will not ask the entrepreneur for a bribe. The
game, therefore, ﬁnishes with the entrepreneur paying taxes. There
is no sufﬁcient margin for agreeing on a positive bribe with the tax
inspector.
Tax revenues depend on the hypothesis made about the
distribution of the “shame cost”: if the speciﬁc j-th “shame cost” is
lower than c⁎, the entrepreneur ﬁnds it worthwhile to evade all taxes;
vice versa, if the j-th entrepreneur's “shame cost” is greater than c⁎,
then the entrepreneur will be honest.
The cumulative probability density deﬁnes the distribution of
individual costs F(cj), where j is the speciﬁc entrepreneur. The fraction
of corrupted entrepreneurs, i.e. with a “shame cost” cj≤c⁎, is given by
F(c⁎); analogously, the fraction of honest entrepreneurs, with a
“shame cost” cjNc⁎, is given by 1−F(c⁎).
On an aggregate level, the tax revenues, with a tax rate ﬁxed at t,
will be equal to the taxes paid by those who ﬁnd themselves in a
positive natural state (with probability (1−δ)) and who have a
“shame cost” which leads them to be honest, and those who are
corrupt, but are discovered in the act of corruption:
E t; qð Þ = Ank G
K
 α
tF c⁎ð Þ 1−δð Þq + Ank G
K
 α
t 1−F c⁎ð Þð Þ 1−δð Þ =
= Ank
G
K
 α
t 1−δð Þ F c⁎ð Þq + 1−F c⁎ð Þ½ 
ð7Þ
As we have said, we assume that the amount of public good G is a
proportion η∈(0,1) of tax revenues, thus ηE(t,q)=G.13 The results do not depend on the existence of a cost for the tax inspector who is
corrupt and detected.
14 See Appendix A for the proof. 15 See Appendix B for the proof.
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By deﬁnition, F is a distribution function associated to a random
variable whose density function f has support [0,1]. The shape of the
function f gives good information about the general level of
entrepreneurs' honesty. In particular, the symmetry of the function f
provides information about the distribution of the entrepreneurs
between those with a high or low sense of shame, brieﬂy the honest
and the corrupt. If f is a centered symmetric function, then the Country
has average level of corruption, and the number of corrupted
entrepreneurs balances the number of honest entrepreneurs. The
case of f asymmetric to the left can be associated to a Country where
most entrepreneurs are corrupt, while f is asymmetric to the right in
Countries where most entrepreneurs are honest. Therefore, so that
our analysis is complete, we need to discuss the three cases discussed
above. Among the distribution functions of random variables with
support in [0,1], the Kumaraswamy law seems to be the more
appropriate choice for F. Indeed, even if the Kumaraswamy distribu-
tion is used in a rather mathematical fashion, it has some features that
make it suitable for our modeling purposes.
The Kumaraswamy law belongs to the family of the two-
parameter distributions, the Beta distribution being the most famous.
The most important feature of the Kumaraswamy random variable is
its mathematical tractability, since being an explicit form of its
distribution function. Indeed, given α1,α2∈(0,+∞), the density
function f and the distribution function F of a Kumaraswamy random
variable are, respectively:
f cð Þ = α1α2cα1−1 1−cα1
 	α2−1; c∈ 0;1½ ; ð8Þ
F cð Þ = 1− 1−cα1 	α2 ; c∈ 0;1½ : ð9Þ
We assume that the distribution of the costs is a Kumaraswamy
law, according to Eqs. (8) and (9). This choice is reasonable, because
the shape of the Kumaraswamy density function changes as the values
of α1 and α2 vary. Therefore, this probability law is suitable for
describing different types of entrepreneurs' ethical behaviors.
More speciﬁcally, if 1bα2bα1, then the shape of the distribution
function is asymmetric to the right, describing entrepreneurs with a
“high shame” effect. Conversely, when 1bα1bα2, then we have
asymmetry to the left, and the entrepreneurs have a “low shame”
effect. If α1=α2=1, then the Kumaraswamy distribution reduces to
the uniform distribution.
In order to describe three different types of entrepreneur behavior,
we then rely on three cases: symmetry, α1=α2=1; asymmetry to the
left, α1=1,α2=2; asymmetry to the right, α1=2,α2=1.
• “Uniform shame” countries.
In this case, the entrepreneurs are assumed to be uniformly
distributed between the honest and the corrupt. The sense of
shame varies accordingly to a uniform distribution, i.e.
F cð Þ = c; ∀c∈ 0;1½ : ð10Þ
By substituting c⁎ with its expression in Eq. (7), a straightforward
computation allows us to rewrite E(t,q) as follows:
E t; qð Þ = 1−δð ÞAnk GU
K
 α
t 1− t 1−qð Þ
2
q
" #
: ð11Þ
By solving ηE(t,q)=GU, we ﬁnd:
GU = η 1−δð ÞAnkK−αt 1−
t 1−qð Þ2
q
 !" # 1
1−α
: ð12Þ
• “Low shame” countries.
The number of corrupt entrepreneurs is assumed to be greater than
that of the honest. The distribution function F is
F cð Þ = 1− 1−cð Þ2; ∀c∈ 0;1½ : ð13Þ
As in the previous case, we substitute c⁎ with its expression in
Eq. (7) and rewrite E(t,q) as follows:
E t; qð Þ = 1−δð ÞAnk GL
K
 α
t q− q−1ð Þ 1− t 1−qð Þ
q
 2
 
: ð14Þ
By solving ηE(t,q)=GL, we have:
GL = η 1−δð ÞAntkK−α q− q−1ð Þ 1−
t 1−qð Þ
q
 2
   11−α
: ð15Þ
• “High shame” countries.
This is the converse case with respect to the previous one. The
number of honest entrepreneurs is greater than that of the corrupt.
In this case, the costs can be synthesized as follows:
F cð Þ = 1− 1−c2
 
= c2; ∀c∈ 0;1½ : ð16Þ
We rewrite E(t,q) in Eq. (7) as follows:
E t; qð Þ = 1−δð ÞAnk GR
K
 α
t 1− t
2 1−qð Þ3
q2
" #
: ð17Þ
By solving GR=ηE(t,q) we have
GR = η 1−δð ÞAntkK−α 1−
t2 1−qð Þ3
q2
( )" # 1
1−α
: ð18Þ
As the tax rate increases, we can detect two different effects in the
behavior of tax revenues:
(1) As the tax rate increases, the number of dishonest entrepre-
neurs who are detected in a corrupt transaction increases and,
therefore, the more numerous corrupt entrepreneurs pay
higher taxes thus increasing the tax revenues;
(2) As the tax rate increases, the number of honest individuals
decreases but they must pay more taxes. Therefore, we have
two opposite effects: on the one hand, the decrease in honest
entrepreneurs reduces tax revenues; on the other hand, the
increase in the tax rate leads to more tax revenues.
The cases of uniform and high shame countries show a U-reversed
relationship between tax revenues and the tax rate: in order to be
more precise, until a certain threshold value, different for the three
cases, the rise in tax rate increases tax revenues. This happens because
the positive effect 1) adding up to an effect 2) that in this range is
positive. After this threshold, the effect 2) becomes negative as the
reduction in the number of honest entrepreneurs is higher than the
rise of the tax rate. In this interval, therefore, the rise in the tax rate
leads to a decrease in tax revenues because the negative effect 2) is
greater than the positive effect 1). With regard to the threshold value,
we can stress that this value appears to be smaller for “uniform
shame” countries and higher for countries with “high shame costs”.
Therefore, in a static context, a State which wants to maximize tax
revenues must take into account the threshold value after which the
revenues are decreasing, whereas the threshold value is different
depending on the shame effect of the country. For a ﬁxed level of tax
rates, we can see that the tax revenues of the countrywith “low shame
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costs” are low, intermediate for those of the “uniform shame” country
and high for the country with “high shame costs”, i.e. ERNEUNEL. This
happens because the variation in the number of corrupt entrepre-
neurs (equal and opposite to that of honest entrepreneurs) is, in
corresponding to high tax rates, higher for the country with “high
shame costs”, intermediate for country with “uniform shame costs”
and low for the country with “low shame costs”. Therefore, for the
“low shame” country, in effect (2) the decrease in honest entrepre-
neurs more than makes up for the increase in the tax rate. As a result,
it is not surprising that, for “low shame” countries tax revenues
increase with respect to the tax rates. Therefore, for “low shame”
countries, there is not a tax rate which maximizes the tax revenues.
The solutions G's explicitly derived in Eqs. (12), (15) and (18) will be
denoted hereafter with G⁎(t,q,k) with the subscripts U,L,R, to
highlight the explicit dependence with respect to t, q and k and
maintain an explicit reference to the level of corruption of the country.
Because G is a proportion η∈(0,1) of tax revenues, thus GRNGUNGL.
4. Dynamic Analysis
The game perspective is now expanded to review the conse-
quences of the tax rate on dynamic revenues and on economic
growth. The entrepreneur can use her/his payoff πi, j(1), i=1,2, either to
consume or invest. We consider a simple constant elasticity utility
function:
U =
C1−σ−1
1−σ ð19Þ
Each entrepreneur maximizes utility over an inﬁnite period of
time, subject to a budget.
max
c∈ℜþ
∫∞
0
e−ρtU Cð Þdt ð20Þ
sub
k
•
= π 1ð Þi; j −C; i = 1;2: ð21Þ
where C is per capita consumption, ρ is the discount rate in time, and
πi, j(1) is the payoff for the j-th entrepreneur.
Since the return on the investment for the entrepreneur is
different in each of the two equilibria found (with −π2, j(1) — and
without corruption π1, j
(1)) the problem is solved for the two cases.
By solving the dynamic game, we can prove the following
proposition16:
Proposition 4.1. Let 0≤c⁎≤1 deﬁned as in Proposition 3.2. Then,
(a) if cj≤c⁎ the growth rate, for the j-th entrepreneur, is
γCj =
1
σ
A
G
K
 α
1−
qt + t + cjq
2
 
−ρ

 
; ð22Þ
(b) if cjNc⁎ the growth rate, for the j-th entrepreneur, is
γNCj = γ
NC =
1
σ
A
G
K
 α
1−tð Þ−ρ

 
: ð23Þ
Equilibrium depends, therefore, on the individual “shame cost”:
• for a given tax rate t, the entrepreneurs with a “shame cost” of
cj≤c⁎, will ﬁnd it worthwhile to be corrupt and so their optimal
equilibriumwill be with corruption. In such an equilibrium, the j-th
entrepreneur will obtain a growth rate of γjC;
• for a given level of tax rate t, entrepreneurs with a “shame cost”
cjNc⁎ will ﬁnd it worthwhile to be honest and their optimal
equilibrium will be without corruption. In such an equilibrium, the
j-th entrepreneur will obtain a growth rate of γNC.
In equilibrium, K=kn applies. Therefore, we now impose the
equilibrium condition K=nk and substitute G with the values found
in Eqs. (12), (15) and (18).
It may be further demonstrated that capital and income also have
the same growth rate of consumption and, therefore, equilibrium
without corruption, from the dynamic viewpoint, is the equilibrium
which allows greater economic growth.17 In addition, since the tax
rate inﬂuences the accumulation of capital, the provision of the public
good and, as a consequence, economic growth, it will also increase
ﬁscal revenues at a steady state. We would like to remind readers that
the static tax revenues are (Eq. (7)):
E t; qð Þ = Ank G
K
 α
t 1−δð Þ F c⁎ð Þq + 1−F c⁎ð Þ½ 
In a steady state, the growth rate of tax revenues should also be
constant and, therefore, E(t,q) and k grow at the same rate. Indeed,
lower revenues today due to evasion, can bring greater growth
through greater capital accumulation and, consequently, greater
revenues tomorrow.
At the aggregate level, we will have a growth rate obtained by
considering the different growth rates for the corresponding
entrepreneurs.
Deﬁne ξ the fraction of honest entrepreneurs. In the equilibrium
with corruption there will be (1−ξ) entrepreneurs, each with her/his
own growth rate γjC, in the equilibrium without corruption there will
be ξ entrepreneurs, each with the same growth rate γNC.
We perform the distinction for the “shame costs” introduced in the
previous section. At the aggregate level, we can prove the following
proposition18:
Proposition 4.2. The aggregate growth rate is:
• “Uniform shame” countries
γU t; qð Þ =
n
σ fAn−αk−α G⁎U t; q; kð Þ α c⁎t q−1ð Þ−t q + 1ð Þ2 + 1 
− ρ− t
2 1−qð Þ2
4q g; ð24Þ
• “Low shame” countries
γL t; qð Þ =
n
σ fAn−αk−α G⁎L t; q; kð Þ α 1− 1−c⁎ð Þ2 t q−1ð Þ−t q + 1ð Þ2 + 124 35
− ρ− t
2 1−qð Þ2
4q g; ð25Þ
16 See Appendix C for the proof.
17 In fact, at a steady state, everything grows at the same rate and therefore k
•
k
is constant.
At equilibriumwith corruptionwe know that k
•
k
= An
−α G⁎ t; q; kð Þ αk−α 2−t 1 + qð Þ½ 
2
−qcj
2
−C
k
.
Since k
•
k
is constant, then the difference between both terms on the right should also be
constant, andbecauseA,n,α, cj,q and t are constant andGU⁎(t,q,k)∼GL⁎(t,q,k)∼GR⁎(t,q,k)∼k,
then C and k should grow at the same rate. Similarly, since y=An−α[G⁎(t,q,k)]αk1−α, at a
steady state, income grows at the same rate as capital. The same applies in the case of
equilibrium without corruption.
18 See Appendix D for the proof.
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• “High shame” countries
γR t; qð Þ =
n
σ fAn−αk−α G⁎R t; q; kð Þ α c⁎ð Þ2t q−1ð Þ−t q + 1ð Þ2 + 1
" #
− ρ− t
2 1−qð Þ2
4q g: ð26Þ
4.1. Calibration
This section calibrates the model to quantitatively illustrate the
long-run effects of the tax rate with different “shame costs”. We start
by assigning values for structural parameters. Since this paper is
motivated by the stylized facts in OECD countries, it is better if we
could calibrate parameters using data from these countries.
We would now like to provide a sensitivity analysis of γ with
respect to t and q.
We proceed by performing a numerical analysis of the behavior of
γ with respect to t and q, since the complexity of the dynamics
involved does not allow closed-form results. Hence, a more intuitive
description of the real situation is also provided.
We refer to the cases discussed above, with low, high and middle
shame countries. We set δ=0.5, σ=0.5, ρ=0.03, η=0.5, n=10,
k=1 and three different values for the technology parameter
A=0.5;1;2.
Most choices in the parameter values are basically grounded in the
literature, and the sources have been shown in Table 1. Some of them
are assumed to have a certain value. A brief discussion about the
assumptions on δ, α and n follows.
δ∈ [0,1] is the probability that the production of the entrepreneur is
0, i.e. the bad state case. We assume that the bad state case occurs with
the sameprobability as thegood state one, i.e. δ=0.5, becausewedonot
want to insert asymmetry in the entrepreneurs' endowments.
α∈ [0,1] is the production externality. As long as α is smaller than
unity, there is a positive externality of capital accumulation, and the
case α=1 is related to no externality of capital accumulation. We also
assume symmetry, in this case and an average amount of externality
of capital accumulation. Therefore, we set α=0.5.
n≥1 represents the number of entrepreneurs. Since no guidelines
appear in the literature to ﬁx a value of n, several different choices
have been implemented in previous studies. We set n=10. We can
detect three different effects in the behavior growth rate both of the
income and of the tax revenues with respect to t.
(1′) As the tax rate increases, the number of honest individuals
decreases, but they must pay more taxes. Therefore we have
two opposite effects: on the one hand the decreasing of honest
entrepreneurs reduces tax revenues and therefore increases
capital accumulation and growth; on the other hand the
increase in tax rate leads to more tax revenues, less capital
accumulation and thus less growth.
(2′) As the tax rate increases, the number of dishonest entrepre-
neurs increases and, therefore, growth is reduced inasmuch as
the number of discovered corrupt entrepreneurs increases. The
newly corrupt entrepreneur, when discovered (as s/he will be
forced to pay taxes but will receive the bribe back), is
tantamount to an entrepreneur whose tax burden has
increased;
(3′) As the tax rate increases, then the amount of public good G⁎,
obtained via balance constraints, increases as well, as does the
growth rate.
If we take into account the behavior of the growth rate with
respect to q, three different effects can be detected.
(1′′) As the monitoring level increases, the number of corrupt
individuals decreases but they must pay more taxes due to
higher control levels. Therefore we have two opposite effects:
on the one hand, the decrease in corrupt entrepreneurs reduces
tax revenues and therefore increases capital accumulation and
growth; on the other hand, the increased monitoring level
leads to more tax revenues, less capital accumulation and thus
less growth.
(2′′) As the monitoring level increases, the number of honest
entrepreneurs increases and, therefore, the tax revenues
increase, reducing capital accumulation and consequently
economic growth.
(3′′) As the monitoring level increases, ceteris paribus, G⁎ increases.
As a consequence, the growth rate increases.
In order to discuss how the growth rate changes as a consequence
of variations in the tax rate, we should stress that all three cases —
“low, middle and high”— shame countries show the same growth rate
behavior. For this reason, we propose only one ﬁgure (“high shame”
country) as representative of all cases (see Fig. 2). Nevertheless, some
differences can be highlighted when the level of monitoring is low or
high. In fact, the effect of the tax rate on the growth rate is more
relevant for the growing values of q, and the growth rate is very
sensitive with respect to twhen the monitoring value tends to 1. This
is reasonable, because in this case all entrepreneurs will ﬁnd it
worthwhile to be honest regardless of their “shame cost” (very
limited effect (2′)). In fact, exasperate monitoring activity removes
the differences between “high” or “low shame” entrepreneurs.
In all three cases — “low, middle and high shame” countries, the
growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value,
after which the growth rate begins to decrease as the tax rate
increases.
In fact, for low tax rates, the increase in growth due to a greater
amount of public good provided (effect (3′)) and smaller capital
accumulation (effect (2′)), are stronger than the negative effect
caused by less capital accumulation by the entrepreneurs (effect (1′)).
Let us explain the meaning of this behavior: when the tax rate grows,
the tax revenues increase due to the fact that the number of corrupted
entrepreneurs who have been detected and who pay more taxes
increases and that the remaining honest entrepreneurs pay more
taxes. Therefore, the increased provision of the public goodmore than
compensates, in terms of economic growth, for the lower capital
accumulation by entrepreneurs and thus economic growth increases.
Therefore the growth rate follows the trend of increasing tax revenue,
i.e. of the increasing amount of public good provided.
Conversely, when the tax rate is high, the decrease in growth due
to the smaller amount of public good provided (3′) is stronger than
the positive effect due to greater capital accumulation by entrepre-
neurs (effects (1′) and (2′)). In this case, the smaller amount of taxes
paid by the honest and by entrepreneurs who have been discovered,
depresses economic growth, via the lower amount of public good
provided.
Table 1
Benchmark parameter values.
Deﬁnition Parameter Value Source
Coefﬁcient of risk aversion σ 0.5 Das and Sarkar (2010)
Time preference rate ρ 0.03 Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004)
Probability of a bad state δ 0.5 Assumption
Share of government
investment
η 0.1 Galì and Perotti (2003)
Coefﬁcient of productivity A 0.5;1;2 Leung and Tse (2001)
Razin and Yuen (1996)
Pindyck and Wang (2009)
Productivity of capital α 0.5 Assumption
Capital per entrepreneur k 1 Stevens (2003)
Number of entrepreneurs n 10 Assumption
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It is important to note that, despite the three cases having the same
behavior, for intermediate tax rates, the rate of growth for “low
shame” countries is lower than that of “uniform shame” countries
which is, in turn, lower than that of the “high shame” countries. This
happens because, in a less corrupt population, honest entrepreneurs
pay taxes even where there is a high tax rate and therefore
accumulate less in the honest countries than in the corrupt ones. In
particular, the growth rate is more sensitive to variations of t in an
honest country rather than in a corrupt country. There is intuitive
reasoning behind this fact: in an honest country, the number of
entrepreneurs paying taxes does not decrease remarkably when the
tax rate increases, in contrast to what happens in a corrupt country.
As we have said, when the monitoring level is low, the behavior of
the growth rate is very similar to when the monitoring level is high,
but with different characteristics: even in this case, the growth rate
increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value, after which
the growth rate begins to decrease. But, it is important to stress that
such a threshold value is different when the monitoring level is low or
high. In fact, when themonitoring level tends to 1, the negative effects
on growth — due to the entrepreneurs detected in a corrupt
transaction having to paymore taxes, depressing capital accumulation
(2′) — is negligible and therefore the amount of public good provided
to entrepreneur increases also for higher tax rate.
The analysis of the behavior of the growth rate with respect to q
agrees with previous results. In particular, when a tax rate is ﬁxed, the
behavior of the growth rate is very different depending on whether
the tax rate is low or high. For a low tax rate level, the growth rate is
roughly constant with the monitoring level: the growth rate does not
depend on the monitoring activity. We have an equilibrium situation,
where the aggregate negative effects balance the expansion of the
growth perfectly. Indeed, in this case, the impulse of public goods due
to greater tax revenues balances the minor capital accumulation by
the entrepreneurs and vice versa.
When a high tax rate t is ﬁxed, the growth rate increases with
respect to the monitoring activity level. The positive effect (3″) is
greater than the tendency to depression due to (1″) and (2″). We
interpret these ﬁndings by noticing that the most important effect of
monitoring activity is to increase the amount of the public goods due
to greater tax revenues. If we rely on technology parameter Awe have
that, ceteris paribus, when we consider A is higher, the growth rate
surface behaviors described above are ampliﬁed and the values of the
growth rates are bigger when A is higher, since the growth rate
increases when entrepreneurs invest their resources. The argument of
ampliﬁcation of effects due to a greater value of A applies hereafter, for
the entire set of numerical analyses we will perform throughout the
paper. Fig. 2 refers to the case of A=2.
We now analyze the corner-solutions. In particular, we focus on
the extremal values of the monitoring activity level q and of the tax
rate t.
• If t=0, then there are no tax revenues for the country. The public
good derived from tax revenues is therefore null, economic analysis
becomes trivial and quite senseless.
• If t=1, then the entire amount of each entrepreneur's production
goes to the State. The presence of a monitoring activity level qNq∘
prevents the mass of entrepreneurs from becoming corrupt: indeed,
in this case c⁎ = 1−q
q
∈ 0;1ð Þ. A closed–form analysis is not suitable,
and we prefer to proceed numerically, by adopting the same set of
parameters used in the global analysis performed above.
Fig. 3 shows our ﬁndings when A=2. The growth rate increases
with respect to q and it is concave in all situations of corruption
within the countries. The positive effect (3″) is more incisive than
the negative impact on growth due to (1″) and (2″). The most
relevant effect of the monitoring activity is the large amount of
public goods due to greater tax revenues. Nevertheless, as the
monitoring activity level becomes bigger, an inverse tendency is
observed, and the growth rate of the country stabilizes.We interpret
this inversion by noticing that heavy tax rates and monitoring
activities depress capital accumulation and, consequently, growth.
Fig. 2. Growth rate vs tax rate, in “high shame” country.
Fig. 3. Growth rate vs monitoring level, when t=1.
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• If q=1, then we have c⁎=0 i.e. the entire population is honest. The
effects on growth due to (2) and (3) disappear. In this case
G⁎ t;1; kð Þ = G⁎U t;1; kð Þ = G⁎L t;1; kð Þ = G⁎R t;1; kð Þ = η 1−δð ÞAn
k
Kα
t
  1
1−α
and
γ t;1ð Þ = γU t;1ð Þ = γL t;1ð Þ = γR t;1ð Þ =
1
σ
An1−αk−α G⁎ t;1; kð Þ½ α 1−tð Þ−ρ
n o
:
By applying the ﬁrst order condition, we ﬁnd a threshold for the tax
rate t1⁎=α such that
t ≤ t⁎1 ⇒
∂
∂tγ t;1ð Þ N 0;
t N t⁎1 ⇒
∂
∂tγ t;1ð Þ b 0:
8><
>: ð27Þ
If the tax rate is low enough (below the critical threshold t1⁎), then the
positive effect on growth due to (4) is more relevant than the
negative effect due to (1). This behavior inverts for t greater than t1⁎.
The economic key is grounded on two arguments: for low tax rates,
capital accumulation is high for low tax rates, even when the State
monitors actively. As a consequence, the country's growth increases.
Conversely, when the monitoring activity is strong and the tax rate is
high, then capital accumulation reduces, and growth reduces as well,
even if the amount of public goods increases. We notice that the tax
rate threshold t1⁎ goes hand in hand with production y, since it
coincides with the parameter α.
• If q=q∘, then we have c⁎=1, and the entire population is corrupt.
Also in this case, we prefer to proceed via numerical simulation, to
provide a more intuitive analysis. The usual parameter set is used.
Fig. 4 shows our ﬁndings for A=2. Since the mass of the population
is corrupt, the effect on growth due to (1′) vanishes.
In this case, the growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up
to a threshold value, after which the growth rate begins to decrease as
the tax rate increases. In fact, for low tax rates, the increase in growth
due to (3′) is stronger than the negative effects due to (2′). Let us
explain themeaning of this behavior: when the tax rate grows, the tax
revenues increase due to the fact that the number of corrupted
entrepreneurs who have been detected and who pay more taxes
increases. Therefore, the increased provision of the public good more
than compensates, in terms of economic growth, for the lower capital
accumulation by entrepreneurs and thus economic growth increases.
In fact, this result is grounded on the fact that, for a low tax rate, the
impetus for growth given by greater tax revenues, i.e. the higher
amount of public good provided, compensates for the lower economic
growth due to lower capital accumulation by entrepreneurs. Con-
versely, when the tax rate is high, the decrease in growth is due to the
joint effect of (2′) and (3′). Furthermore, as already noted above, the
growth rate is more sensitive to the variations of the tax rates as the
honesty of the country grows. This explains why an honest country
can reach a maximum (minimum) level of growth rate that is higher
(lower) than that of a corrupt country (see the global maxima and
global minima in Fig. 4).
4.2. Bargaining strength
In an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, the surplus is shared
unequally between the tax inspector and the taxpayer, and the
equilibrium bribe (bNB) is:
bNB = μ Ak
G
K
 α
t−
qcj
1−qð Þ
  
: ð28Þ
where μ ≡ ε
ε + β
is the share of the surplus which goes to the tax
inspector and β and ε the bargaining strength of the entrepreneur and
the tax inspector respectively.Thus, the bribe paid to the inspector
increases as the inspector's bargaining strength increases, expressed
as ε. In fact, by computing this derivative we observe that:
∂bNB
∂μ = Ak
G
K
 α
t−
qcj
1−qð Þ
  
N 0 ð29Þ
Increasing the bargaining power of the tax inspector increases the
bribe which s/he can obtain. In the model, we also see that corruption
does not depend on the distribution of the surplus between the
inspector and the tax evader, but only on the amount of the surplus τ.
In fact, the number of corrupt entrepreneurs is not dependent on the
parameters β and ε. On the contrary, such parameters affect any rates
of income growth and tax revenue in that a different distribution of
power in the area of bargaining affects accumulation by the
entrepreneur and, hence, the growth rate.
In particular, in Proposition 4.1, we see that if cjNc⁎, the growth
rate for the j-th entrepreneur is:
γNC =
1
σ
A
G
K
 α
1−tð Þ−ρ
 
ð30Þ
and it is not dependent on the parameters β and ε. On the contrary, if
cj≤c⁎ the growth rate for the j-th entrepreneur is dependent on the
parameters β and ε in that this is the equilibrium where the
entrepreneur pays the bribe and the value of this bribe depends on
β and ε. The growth rate, if cj≤c⁎, will be:
γCj =
1
σ
A
G
K
 α
1−μt + q t + cj
 
μ−1ð Þ
h i
−ρ
 
: ð31Þ
As a result, the aggregate growth rate will also be affected by the
bargaining strength of the inspector and the evader. We denote it as
γ(μ). In particular, the aggregate growth rate is linearwith respect to μ.
We can detect two opposite effects in the behavior growth rate
both of the income and of tax revenues with respect to μ:
(1′′′) As the bargaining strength of the inspector increases, the
entrepreneur must give a greater share of evasion to corruption,
i.e. to the tax inspector. In this case, ceteris paribus, as the
bargaining strength of the inspector increases, a lesser amount of
resources will be allocated to investment and generate lower
growth;
(2′′′) As the bargaining strength of the inspector increases, the
entrepreneur is able to transfer a greater part (μqcj) of her/his
“shame cost” to the tax inspector. In this case, ceteris paribus, as
the bargaining strength of the inspector increases, a greater
amount of resources will be allocated to investment and
generate higher growth.Fig. 4. Growth rate vs tax rate, when q=q∘.
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In order to describe the constant rate of decay of γ(μ), we
introduce the subscripts U,L,R and proceed numerically adopting the
usual parameter set.
• “Uniform shame” countries
γ ′U μð Þ =
c⁎
σ
⋅An−α G⁎U t; q; kð Þ
 αk−αt q−1ð Þ + q c⁎ð Þ2
2σ
:
• “Low shame” countries
γ ′L μð Þ =
1−c⁎ð Þ2
σ
⋅An−α G⁎L t; q; kð Þ
 αk−αt q−1ð Þ + q c⁎ð Þ2
2σ
:
• “High shame” countries
γ ′R μð Þ =
c⁎ð Þ2
σ
⋅An−α G⁎R t; q; kð Þ
 αk−αt q−1ð Þ + q c⁎ð Þ2
2σ
:
In the three cases, the same ﬁndings are obtained, and Fig. 5 shows
our results for A=2.
We see that the growth rate does not increase at all when the
monitoring level is high and the tax rate is low. In contrast, the growth
rate increases with respect to the parameter μ when either the
monitoring level or the tax rate is high. In this case, the aggregate
effect of (1‴) is weaker than the positive effect due to (2‴). Therefore,
as the bargaining strength of the inspector increases, the growth rates
increase as well.
This result is compatible with the economic evidence that, when
the tax rate and the monitoring activity level are high enough, a
proportion of a country's surplus going towards incentivizing the
action of tax inspectors has a positive impact on the country's growth
rate. The size of such a positive impact varies according to the tax rate
which has been applied, the capital productivity, the monitoring level
and the marginal utility elasticity. Even if the presence of a part of
surplus for the inspectors subtracts resources from the entrepreneurs'
investments, the larger amount of taxes paid under a stronger
monitoring regime allows for a larger amount of public goods via
balance constraints, and this, in turn, permits growth to become
higher.
5. Conclusions
The present paper provides a study of the problem of the optimal
tax rate, in a dynamic environment where there is widespread
corruption. The static analysis of Cerqueti and Coppier (2009) has
been extended in a dynamic context, incorporating the presence of a
public sector. We introduced endogenous corruption into a variant
of the Ramsey growth model where a government taxes private
producers and uses the resources to either supply public capital.
Incorporating in the growthmodel also the “productive” effect of tax
revenues i.e. the provision of public goods, we obtain different
results from e.g. Chen (2003) and Lin and Yang (2001) who consider
only the negative effect of taxes on capital accumulation. In fact, in a
long run analysis, the result derives from the basic tenet of our
model that evasion on one hand stimulates investment, accumula-
tion and thereby growth but, on the other hand, reduces tax
revenues and therefore the provision of the public good. In order to
be more precise, we show that in all three cases — “low, middle and
high shame” countries, the growth rate increases as the tax rate
increases up to a threshold value, after which the growth rate begins
to decrease as the tax rate increases. As we showed, this result
derives from the behavior of tax revenues in a static framework.
Since higher (lower) tax revenues imply a higher (lower) provision
of public goods, in our model the growth rate is driven by the
amount of public good rather than the capital accumulation by
entrepreneurs. This is understandable if we consider that not all
resources are assigned to capital accumulation: indeed, if evasion is
detected by a corrupt inspector, the entrepreneur must give half of
the evaded taxes to the inspector (bribe) reducing, in this way, the
resources devoted to the capital accumulation and therefore to the
growth. Since in our calibration we assume that the productivity of
public good and of private capital is the same, then the State has a
rate of saving higher than the one of the entrepreneurs'. Therefore,
in a comparison between resources that detract to entrepreneurs via
taxation and used for provision of the public good and resources
accumulated by entrepreneurs, the former let the country grow
more than the latter.
As a consequence, if the policy maker wants to maximize the
growth rate, then s/he must set the rate to the corresponding tax rate.
As we said this threshold value is different depending on the
monitoring level and the speciﬁc “inner honesty” of the country. In
particular, given the “inner honesty” of the country, the lower the
maximizing tax rate, the lower the monitoring level. On the other
hand, given the monitoring level put in place in a speciﬁc country, the
more honest a country, the greater the maximizing tax rate. This
result is different from the U-shaped curve between growth rate and
tax rate shown by Lin and Yang (2001), as they simply consider public
consumer goods and then economic growth can increase as the tax
rate increases because resources are diverted from the unproductive
Fig. 5. Derivative of γ w.r.t. μ: “Uniform shame” country.
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public sector to the productive private sector. In addition, we ﬁnd that
a high probability of auditing increases the growth rate; conversely,
Chen (2003) ﬁnds that this measure has ambiguous effect on
economic growth, due mainly to its indirect effect upon tax
compliance and the tax rate.
Appendix A. The Nash bargaining bribe
Let PπΔ = Pπ2; j−Pπ1; j = π
1ð Þ
Δ ;π
2ð Þ
Δ
 
be the vector of the differences
in the payoffs between the case of agreement and disagreement about
the bribe, between inspector and entrepreneur. In accordance with
generalized Nash bargaining theory, the division between two agents
will solve:
max
b∈ℜþ
π 1ð ÞΔ
h iβ⋅ π 2ð ÞΔh iε ð32Þ
in formula
max
b∈ℜþ
Ak
G
K
 α
t−tq−cjq
 
− 1−qð Þb
 β 1−ηð ÞE
n
+ 1−qð Þb− 1−ηð ÞE
n
 ε
ð33Þ
that is the maximum of the product between the elements of PπΔ and
where Ak G
K
 α
1−tð Þ; 1−ηð ÞE
n
h i
is the point of disagreement, i.e. the
payoffs that the entrepreneur and the inspector respectively
would obtain if they did not come to an agreement. The parameters
β and ε can be interpreted as measures of bargaining strength. It is
now easy to check that the tax inspector gets a share μ = ε
ε + β
of the
surplus τ, i.e. the bribe is b=μτ. More generally μ reﬂects the
distribution of bargaining strength between the two agents. The
surplus τ is the saving which comes from not paying taxes, net of “
shame cost”, which awaits the entrepreneur if s/he is found out:
τ = Ak G
K
 α
t− qcj
1−qð Þ
 
.
Then the bribe bNB is an asymmetric (or generalized) Nash
bargaining solution and is given by:
bNB = μ Ak
G
K
 α
t−
qcj
1−qð Þ
  
ð34Þ
that is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame, ∀q≠1.
Appendix B. Solution to the static game
The static game is solved with the backward induction method,
which allows identiﬁcation at the equilibria. Starting from stage 2, the
entrepreneur needs to decide whether to negotiate with the
inspector. Both payoffs are then compared, because the inspector
asked for a bribe.
(2) At stage two the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe if, and only
if
π 1ð Þ2;j ≥ π
1ð Þ
1;j⇒ ð35Þ
Ak
G
K
 α
1− t 1 + qð Þ
2
 
−
kqcj
2
 
≥ Ak G
K
 α
1−tð Þ⇒
⇒cjb
t 1−qð Þ
q
= c⁎
ð36Þ
(1) Going up the decision-making tree, at stage one the tax
inspector decides whether to ask for a positive bribe or not.
– Let cjbc⁎ deﬁned in Eq. (36). Then the tax inspector knows
that if s/he asks for a positive bribe, the entrepreneur will
agree to negotiate and the ﬁnal bribe will be bNB. Then at
stage one, the tax inspector asks for a bribe if, and only if
π 2ð Þ2;j Nπ
2ð Þ
1;j⇒
⇒
1−ηð ÞE
n
+ Ak
G
K
 α t 1−qð Þ
2
−Ak G
K
 α qkcj
2
N
1−ηð ÞE
n
ð37Þ
that is always veriﬁed. Thus, if cjbc⁎, then the tax inspector
asks for a bribe bNB, which the entrepreneur will accept.
- Let cj≥c⁎. Then the tax inspector knows that the entrepre-
neurs will not accept any possible bribe, so s/he will be
honest and will ask the entrepreneurs for tax payment.
Appendix C. Solution of the dynamic game
In the equilibrium with corruption, the entrepreneur's proﬁt is:
π 1ð Þ2;j = Ak
G
K
 α
1−
qt + t + cjq
2
 
ð38Þ
thus the constraint is:
k
•
= Ak
G
K
 α
1−
qt + t + cjq
2
 
− C ð39Þ
The Hamiltonian function is:
H = e−ρt
C1−σ−1
1−σ + λ Ak
G
K
 α
1−
qt + t + cjq
2
 
−C
 
ð40Þ
where λ is a constant variable. Assuming G and K as given,
optimization provides the following ﬁrst order conditions:
e−ρtC−σ−λ = 0 ð41Þ
and
λ
•
= −λ A G
K
 α
1−
qt + t + cjq
2
 
 
ð42Þ
By the ﬁrst condition, the consumption growth rate is obtained:
γCj =
1
σ
A
G
K
 α
1−
qt + t + cjq
2
 
−ρ

 
: ð43Þ
In the equilibriumwithout corruption, the entrepreneur's proﬁt is:
π 1ð Þ1;j = Ak
G
K
 α
1−tð Þ ð44Þ
Thus the constraint is:
k
•
= Ak
G
K
 α
1−tð Þ− C ð45Þ
The Hamiltonian function is:
H = e−ρt
C1−σ−1
1−σ + λ Ak
G
K
 α
1−tð Þ−C
 
ð46Þ
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Optimization provides the consumer growth rate:
γNC =
1
σ
A
G
K
 α
1−tð Þ−ρ

 
: ð47Þ
Appendix D. Aggregate growth
Aggregate growth γ is given by the sum of the rates of obtainable
growth considered by the number of entrepreneurs who are
positioned in that equilibrium. Thus, at the equilibrium with
corruption, there will be (1− ξ) entrepreneurs while at the
equilibrium without corruption, there will be ξ entrepreneurs.
We impose K=nk.
At the equilibrium without corruption, the growth rate γNC in Eq.
(47) is independent of reputation costs and will therefore be equal for
each entrepreneur with reputation costs cjNc⁎; at the equilibrium
with corruption, the growth rate γjC in Eq. (43) is dependent on
reputation costs for which reason each entrepreneur, with a
reputation cost of cj≤c⁎, will have a different growth rate. Thus
γ t; qð Þ = 1−ξð Þ 1
σ
An−α G⁎ t; q; kð Þ½ αk−α 1− qt + t
2
 
−ρ

 
− 1
2σ
q∫c⁎0 cjdcj
h i
+ + ξ⋅ 1
σ
An−α G⁎ t; q; kð Þ½ αk−α 1−tð Þ−ρ :
ð48Þ
Substituting ξ=F(c⁎), where F has the three expressions in
Eqs. (10), (13) and (16) into (48) and after some simpliﬁcations we
obtain the aggregate growth rate in the three cases.
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